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Environmental (Toxic) Torts
Jack W. Snyder*
I want to say first of all that this may be the only time in my
career that I stand in for a federal judge, so I'm grateful for the
opportunity. I come from the world of medical academia and my
venue there is as a pathologist and toxicologist. As a pathologist,
I have training very similar to Cyril Wecht's, but Cyril focused
his career in the medical examiner's office, and I got into drugs.
So I basically tell people that I'm into drugs, and that at least
piques their interest. Toxic tort-what is it? Ten years ago if
you used the term toxic tort, people thought you were referring
to food poisoning. We're not talking about that today. We're
talking about a burgeoning arena of litigation that now has its
own casebooks, its own conferences, and its own medical and
legal scholarship.
What do asbestos, PCB's, Agent Orange, bendectin, swine flu
vaccine, IUD's (intrauterine devices), pesticides, paraquat,
breast implants, multiple chemical sensitivities, norplant, ciga-
rettes, lead, and accutane have in common? These are the sub-
jects of ongoing, or in some cases, resolved litigation in the are-
na that has been designated as toxic or environmental torts. A
reasonable definition of a toxic tort is "one or more individuals
alleging physical injury or other harm due to exposure to envi-
ronmental agents."
I'm going to talk rather conceptually. My bottom line message
is that toxic tort litigation has become a battleground upon
which the concept of compensable injury is being inexorably
expanded. Indeed, the ever-increasing, ever-expanding definition
of compensable injury has become a critical driving force in this
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sphere of legal activity.
I want to address at least two of the most important issues in
toxic tort litigation today; that is, the issue of injury and how we
define it, and then, how we prove causation. I will try to show
you what's the same and what's different about the way scien-
tists and lawyers think about these issues. It's a real pleasure
for somebody from the medical ivory tower to come and talk to a
group of jurists because, as I view it, it is the jurist who can
make a real difference in how society approaches these prob-
lems.
Along the way, I'll try to put a few things in perspective by
introducing you to a bit of the mechanics, the personnel, and the
process of the discipline known as toxicology. Let's paint with a
broad brush concerning that discipline before we talk about
injury and causation. Toxicology as a scientific discipline has
become the tail that wags the dog of pharmacology. In pharma-
cology, we study the effects of drugs in what we call biologic
matrices. We use the term "biologic matrix" because it allows me
to talk generally about the effects of environmental agents on
anything from subcellular molecules all the way up to an intact
human being. We can talk about interactions of drugs or chemi-
cals with something that is part of a cell, one cell, a tissue, an
organ, or the entire body. Each of these is a biologic matrix at a
different level.
I'm going to explain to you some of the ways that lawyers and
scientists think differently about injury and causation, and how
those differences play out in toxic tort, product liability, and
workers' compensation litigation. Again, the most important
point I want to make today is that we are expanding our notion
of compensable injury in this society. We have to decide, and
jurists in particular have to decide, to what extent they want to
continue that expansion or to put the brakes on it.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court is one of the few state su-
preme courts that has actually defined compensable injury. In a
workers' compensation case, the court defined compensable inju-
ry as any adverse or hurtful change in the system which would
cause lessened facility of the natural use of any bodily activity,
or capacity.' So there's one definition from a state supreme
court.
There are increasing numbers of alternative definitions of
injury-compensable or otherwise. To aid your understanding, I
1. Pawlosky v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 525 A.2d 1204 (Pa.
1987).
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want to walk you through this conceptual road map. First, let's
walk through it wearing a scientist's or physician's hat. Then
we'll put on the jurist's, or legal professional's hat, and investi-
gate what's similar and what's different about the use of these
words in law, science, and medicine.
Let's look at something you've all heard of-benzene. It's one
of the few molecules that the United States Supreme Court has
weighed in on. Back in 1980, the Court issued a decision that
involved one of the permissible exposure limits set by the Occu-
pational Safety and Health Administration ("OSHA"). The Court
viewed the question as whether OSHA had come up with the
appropriate evidence to support a reduction of the permissible
exposure limit from ten parts per million in the workplace to one
part per million.2 As I think you'll recall, the Court said that
OSHA had not met its burden of proof, and therefore, OSHA
could not lower the permissible exposure limit for benzene from
ten parts per million down to one. But let's start with the ben-
zene molecule and any biologic matrix-anything from a subcel-
lular particle all the way up to an intact human being. And let's
bring the environmental agent and the biologic matrix into the
presence of one another. By presence, do we mean geographic
proximity, or something more? Hold that question in abeyance
and go with me on these words. I hope you'll begin to see that
the different ways people think about these terms often depend
on which professional hat they are wearing.
So we bring the molecule and the tissue into the presence of
one another. One of two things can happen according to current
western biomedical thought. There's either an impact, and we'll
define that momentarily, or there is no impact. I can bring a
benzene molecule into the closest possible proximity with the
cell membrane and something may happen or something may
not. They may bounce off one another, they may actually have
some kind of chemical reaction, or they may not.
Scientists describe varying kinds of impact in physical, chemi-
cal, or physicochemical terms. They also have ways to measure
this impact. The next question asked by scientists and physi-
cians who study cell injury mechanisms is: "If there's an impact,
does the biologic matrix respond to that impact?" Well, there's
either going to be response or there's not going to be response.
The fact that I bring a chemical into the presence of a biologic
matrix and it has an impact that I can measure does not mean




that the biologic matrix will in turn respond. It may or may not.
And we can measure that response. When something biologic
responds to a chemical in the environment, that response can be
viewed either as a beneficial effect or an adverse effect. It's im-
portant to understand that contact between a chemical and a
human being does not necessarily produce an adverse or unde-
sirable event.
Many scientists and physicians will describe the effects of
certain chemicals as beneficial. For example, appropriate
amounts of vitamins and nutrients are obvious sources of benefi-
cial effects. The science of immunology is full of examples of
responses to chemical exposure that produce beneficial effects
for an organism or biologic matrix.
But if there is an adverse or undesirable effect that can be
defined in different ways that well discuss later, that's not the
end of the story. In western science and medicine we recognize
that the adverse effect leads to one of two events. The matrix
either repairs or adapts to the adverse effect or it does not. Fail-
ure to adapt or repair can be viewed as a form of permanent
injury. Most scientists and physicians, however, characterize
irreversible injury at more than one level. Importantly, at least
two levels of damage are distinguished by the concept of func-
tionality. That is, some adverse effects that are not repaired in
humans or biologic matrices represent a kind of damage that is
not accompanied by functional deficit. What's functional deficit?
If I knock out a segment of my brain and I can't walk, that's a
functional deficit. If I destroy my bone marrow with toxic chemi-
cals so that I can't make blood cells, that's a functional deficit.
But there are many situations where we have damage but it
doesn't affect the way we live. It doesn't influence our quality of
life or lifestyle in ways that anyone can objectively verify or
measure. Scientists, physicians, and some courts call this "de
minimis damage."
I don't know how many of you are from the Pennsylvania
Commonwealth Court or have adjudicated workers' compensa-
tion cases. Some scientific, medical, and workers' compensation
professionals say that disease is rampant, that disease is every-
where. The notion, however, that everything is diseased or that
all forms of injury to biologic matrices should be defined as dis-
ease does not help the jurist who must decide if wealth is to be
transferred from one party to another.
In my view, a lot of de minimis damage occurs that is not
accompanied by dysfunction. De minimis damage alone cannot
and does not define disease. What can and must define disease
is quantitatively verifiable, measurable, biologically significant
Vol. 34:899
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change that leads to abnormal function that causes a problem in
someone's lifestyle or quality of life.
In the workers' compensation arena, once we get an expert or
a decision-maker to characterize a claimant's problem as quanti-
tatively significant damage or dysfunction, we still have to de-
cide if the disease or dysfunction is work related. As most of you
know, the statutory and caselaw definitions of the scope of work-
relatedness vary among the states. But whether we call it an
occupational disease or a non-occupational disease, we ultimate-
ly get to the concept of compensable injury.
What is driving all of this is the great desire of many in our
society to transfer wealth from one party to another. In toxic or
environmental tort litigation, you as jurists are the focal point
for assuring that those transfers get made appropriately. It's one
thing to talk conceptually about injury, but at some point your
major concern is when and how to transfer wealth from-one
party to another to compensate for that injury.
Now let's take off the scientific-medical hat and let's put on
the legal hat for a moment. Let's ask ourselves: "What is the
legal system doing with these concepts and terms?" As a point of
departure, let's focus on the terms "presence," "impact," "re-
sponse," "adverse effect," "de minimis damage," and "disease." I
would submit that for each term, there is at least one court,
somewhere in this nation, that has equated that term with com-
pensable injury. This is the key concept for the day. Understand
that each of these terms can be equated with compensable inju-
ry. Why is that of great significance, at least from a toxicologist's
and lawyer's point of view? Because the quantum of evidence
required to prove causation, the numbers and types of experts
that counsel must bring to the court, and the nature of the legal
argument ultimately depend on how you characterize the com-
pensable injury.
When I tell the scientists and physicians in any forum that
the concept of bringing a benzene molecule into the presence of
human bone marrow has been equated with compensable injury,
they say: "No wonder our legal system is so screwed up." Many
of these professionals simply are not prepared to accept the idea
that something less than objectively verifiable and quantitative-
ly significant harm is legally compensable. My colleagues in
medicine and science invariably express surprise, chagrin, and
occasional disgust when I explain the evolution of at least three
new torts in American common law. The first of these torts pro-
vides compensation for increased risk of future harm. The sec-
ond compensates for fear of present or future harm. And the
third transfers wealth on the basis of outrage. What are the
1996
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elements of proving any of these torts in a particular jurisdic-
tion? That certainly varies, as does the kind of proof required to
overcome the causation hurdle. Some of the plaintiffs' counsel in
the breast implant litigation will tell you that the jury verdicts
for their clients are transferring wealth on the basis of outrage.
The science here is not what is making the day. The bottom line
for many observers of this litigation is that juries are making
these awards because they are outraged by what they perceive
to be the conduct of the manufacturers in going to market before
the products were adequately evaluated. The point for continu-
ing debate, however, is the propriety of imposing a 1995 stan-
dard of care with regard to toxicology testing for pre-market
purposes onto a product that was marketed in the 1940's, 1950's,
1960's, and 1970's. Some juries seem to be imposing a standard
of care in a backwards manner.
So anyone involved with toxic torts should keep these three
relatively new tort concepts in mind. If you ask me what the
elements of those torts are, I think they vary. I don't know what
it takes to prove the tort of outrage, but it's clear that at least a
few of the breast implant juries know what it takes.
Before we leave the concept of injury and move to causation, I
want to bring you up to date conceptually on how the medical
and scientific community conceives the molecular aspects of
injury to a biological matrix. We're not going to get quantitative
here and I'm not going to show you a lot of graphs or charts.
This is a brief digression into biology-just enough science to
try to bring some important points together for you. Let's look at
the fat molecules in all the membranes of the cells in your body.
We call this the lipid bilayer model of cell membranes. This
cartoon depicts the way western science conceives of the outer
barriers to all of your cells as well as some of the barriers found
inside your cells. Embedded in the fat molecules are various
kinds of proteins. The reason you need fat and protein in your
diet is because you have a constant turnover of these molecules.
You're constantly breaking these down and making new
ones-it's a dynamic process. Some proteins span the membrane
channel and provide a canal or mode of entry for various sub-
stances, both wanted and unwanted, into a cell-or into a hu-
man being, if you want to think on a macro level. There are a
number of things that can happen when membranes interact
with environmental agents. Let's discuss a few of them.
Anesthetics and alcohols are two kinds of agents that are well
known to fluidize membranes. What we mean by fluidizing
membranes is perturbing or interfering with the movements and
relationships of fat molecules in cell membranes. Sometimes we
904 Vol. 34:899
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screw up the function of membranes by exposing them to suf-
ficient amounts of alcohol or anesthetics.
Drugs, poisons, and toxins can also interfere with the normal
function of protein channels. This is a significant area of phar-
maceutic and toxicologic research. Many drugs, for example, that
are used to treat high blood pressure and other conditions alter
the function of these channels by preventing the movement of
sodium or calcium through them. These drugs are often designed
with the idea of changing cellular function. Sometimes we in-
troduce a little "injury" to overcome or compensate for some
other problem. With some drugs, however, the margin for error
is quite small. A slight excess can rapidly change a desired per-
turbation into an unwanted adverse effect that may occasionally
be life-threatening.
Most of you know what it means for butter to become rancid.
Well, one of the most popular explanations for the aging process
involves the idea that our brain, heart, and other tissues gradu-
ally rancidify over time. In many health food stores you can find
entire shelves of products known as anti-oxidants. With anti-
oxidant research, the pharmaceutical industry is trying to find
ways to slow or prevent the rancidification of fat in biologic
membranes, a process of cell injury known as lipid peroxidation.
Toxicologists believe that lipid peroxidation is one of the unde-
sirable outcomes of oxidative stress, a term that emphasizes the
potentially beneficial as well as detrimental role of highly chemi-
cally reactive molecular forms of oxygen.
Another mechanism of cell injury involves the cross-linking of
cellular proteins. These channels and other proteins that func-
tion in signal transduction mechanisms can be disrupted by
linking them so that they can no longer do what they are sup-
posed to do. It's like taking ropes and tying them together.
That's what we mean by cross-linking.
Before we leave mechanisms, I should remind you of a funda-
mental principle of toxicology. It's the dose of something that
makes it a poison. Remember that a glass of water is probably
beneficial for each of us while a bathtub full will most likely kill
some of us. Why? If you drink a bathtub full of water, you'll
dilute the sodium concentration in your blood. It may fall to the
point that seizures develop and death ensues if you're not prop-
erly treated. An aspirin or two might be good for you in terms of
making your blood a little less clottable. A lot of people out there
are taking small amounts of aspirin to prevent strokes. On the
other hand, the ingestion of a hundred aspirin will probably kill
at least one person in this room. So it's the dose that makes the




There are several other basic mechanisms of injury that I
don't have time to address. I've just given you a flavor of some of
the concepts used by scientists and physicians to characterize
the effect of an environmental agent on the function of a human
being or any biologic matrix.
I won't spend a lot of time on this, but just so you're aware,
science and medicine have a number of ways to measure injury.
We actually believe we can quantitate some aspects of injury. It
is these kinds of studies that can provide the basis for opinions
expressed by toxicologists, epidemiologists, physicians, and other
experts in legal proceedings. When these professionals reach
their conclusions, sometimes those opinions are based on moun-
tains of papers they've read, but other times there isn't any
data, so they just make it up-they speculate. And it's your job
as jurists to try to figure out-and of course juries have to do
this, too-who's speculating and who isn't.
Somebody was talking about liver function studies earlier
today. How is it that we can take a blood sample and determine
that somebody's liver has been damaged or isn't functioning as
well as it should? Well, we take that sample into the laboratory,
such as the one I run, and we measure the release of enzymes
into that blood. Physicians also request similar tests of enzyme
release into the blood when they try to diagnose a heart attack.
Enzymes are proteins that make a lot things happen in your
body. The primary function of enzymes is to catalyze or acceler-
ate the rates of chemical reactions. If you don't have those en-
zymes, or if you shut them down, many chemical processes in
your body don't go forward. If you shut down some of the en-
zymes responsible for production of membrane voltage and ener-
gy in the brain or heart, you will kill those cells and that human
being. Virtually all cells have power plants known as mitochon-
dria. Why does cyanide kill people within minutes? Because it
interferes with the function of a very specific mitochondrial en-
zyme called cytochrome oxidase. Cyanide shuts that enzyme
down and prevents normal function of mitochondria. If your
tissues can't utilize sugar and fat to produce energy because
they don't have functional cytochrome oxidase, you die quickly.
Importantly, we can measure losses of enzyme activity, provid-
ing yet another marker of cell injury.
Now I want to talk about causation. I want to move from
injury to causation on the premise that our definitions of com-
pensable injury ultimately determine what must be brought to
the table to prove causation. Our conceptual roadmap of injury
can remind us of a fundamental tension in toxic tort litigation.
906 Vol. 34:899
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The plaintiffs counsel typically seeks to push the definition of
compensable injury towards "presence" and away from "disease."
It's much easier to show mere exposure to a substance, and
equate that to compensable injury, than it is to show that a
substance has caused disease. On the other hand, defense coun-
sel typically argues in product liability or toxic tort cases that
nothing short of quantitatively significant damage is deserving
of the transfer of wealth from one party to another in our soci-
ety.
First we'll discuss cause-and-effect relationships as they are
perceived in science and medicine, and then we'll look at causa-
tion and its terminology as you know it in American law. My
comments derive from many sources, including a valuable piece
by Professor Brennan in the Cornell Law Review.3
Isaac Newton, the physicist, and John Locke, the philosopher,
articulated some concepts of causation that guided western sci-
entific thought for several hundred years. Quantitative mechan-
ics and the laws of motion and acceleration (as mathematically
expressed by Newton and epistemologically explained by Locke)
theorized a limited power of one object to produce directional
change in another via collision. Thus mechanical contacts be-
tween particulate objects provided the basis for a mechanical
notion of causation known as corpuscularianism. Along with
positivism, which is the belief that scientific knowledge continu-
ously expands, corpuscularian concepts increasingly influenced
legal approaches to scientific evidence in the 18th, 19th, and
early 20th centuries.
Hempel summarized the positivism-corpuscularian view of
scientific theory as a relationship between a covering law (one
set of deductive principles) and an explanadum (the phenome-
non that the covering law was to explain). The nature of that
relationship (the explanans, or ultimate explanation) was usual-
ly expressed in causal language. Thus, according to Hempel,
science progresses as deductive reasoning applies ever-expand-
ing covering laws to more and more phenomena, enrolling them
into causal chains that in turn connect previously unexplained
phenomena. Uncertainty results only when a covering law can-
not be applied to a phenomenon. Hempel further argued that
deductive reasoning outweighs inductive reasoning as the prima-
ry method of causal explanation, of prediction, and of knowledge
in general.
3. See Troyen A. Brennan, Causal Chains and Statistical Links: The Role of




The development of calculus, matrix analysis, quantum me-
chanics, and the theory of relativity in the 20th century under-
mined Newtonian mechanics and corpuscularian approaches to
scientific evidence. Statistical relationships and inductive rea-
soning, which rely on random sampling and probability calcula-
tion, were increasingly accepted as bases for causal propositions.
Medicine and science recognized the validity, the importance,
indeed, even the indispensability of probabilistic reasoning in
the language of scientific explanation. The concept of deductive,
either/or, causal chain analysis gave way to emphasis on induc-
tive/probabilistic reasoning and production of evidence to sup-
port or deny the validity of a particular hypothesis. Science
progresses as some theories and hypotheses provide better caus-
al explanations than others. As Professor Brennan has suggest-
ed, if causation is a matter of theory, and if theories are modi-
fied over time, then causation is not a simple either/or proposi-
tion.4 The probability that one event caused another can be in-
creased or decreased, depending on how well new evidence fits
with the guiding theory.
Thus, concepts of causation have been modified to allow for
probabilities. By contrast, the expression or articulation of cau-
sation most often has not. The language of causation still cen-
ters on deductive causal chains. Confusion arises when a scien-
tific explanation is framed in deductive causal chain terms, but
the evidence to support that explanation is summarized by a
probability statement. Many scientists and physicians admit
that the language of causation they use often expresses induc-
tive/probabilistic reasoning as deductive reasoning or in deduc-
tive terms. The bottom line, however, is that the metaphor of
science as a constantly growing causal chain is no longer appro-
priate. Unfortunately, this idea has not gained a strong foothold
in American jurisprudence. Current scientific concepts of causa-
tion continue to be poorly communicated in current legal articu-
lation of causation.
If causation is, at least in part, a probabilistic concept, then
decision makers must deal with degrees, types, and/or levels of
uncertainty. This task is typically uncomfortable for jurists and
legislators who have not had some formal exposure to
probabilistic thinking. In the absence of continuing judicial edu-
cation, these analytical problems are likely to persist because
few attorneys have training in probabilistic reasoning, and the
4. Troyen A. Brennan & R.L. Carter, Legal and Scientific Probability of Cau-
sation of Cancer and Other Environmental Diseases in Individuals, 10 J. HEALTH
POL. POLY L. 33 (1985).
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percentage of young people studying physical and biologic sci-
ence has been decreasing. Indeed, the medical and scientific
establishment has expressed grave concern because the number
of American-born individuals pursuing careers in biomedical
research is also decreasing.
Does any of this discussion have any real significance for the
judiciary? I suppose the answer depends on your view of the role
of science and medicine in the legal process. In my experience,
crowded dockets and limited resources severely constrain the
ability of most courts to deal seriously with scientific evidence
and experts. Increasing numbers of judges, however, seek advice
on how to improve their performance as Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceutical, Inc.5 evidentiary "gatekeepers." Because time is
short, I can only discuss one analytical framework that may aid
those jurists make serious efforts to separate the wheat from the
chaff.
What are the criteria that scientists and physicians typically
use, or should be using, when they render an opinion that sub-
stance X caused effect Y? In other words, what are the scientific
criteria for proof of causation that are out there today? These
criteria have been variously known over the years as the Evans-
Henle-Koch postulates.
We can, for example, address these causation criteria in the
context of silicone breast implants. As we go through these
statements, ask yourself: "For a particular adverse effect, dis-
ease, or other form of legal cognizable injury, how many of these
criteria have been satisfied by the available scientific and medi-
cal evidence?" Then ask yourself: "How many of these criteria do
I feel have to be fulfilled before I can say that X causes Y?" If
you poll the members of any profession or group, and ask each of
them how many of these criteria are needed to opine, with a
reasonable degree of medical or scientific certainty, that X caus-
es Y, you'll get answers varying anywhere from just one to all
nine. Most of you in this room will demand satisfaction of more
than one but less than all nine criteria.
First, the current rate of a disorder or injury in a population
(prevalence) and the rate of new injuries or disorders in a specif-
ic period of time (incidence) should be significantly higher in
those exposed to implants than in controls not so exposed. Of
course, you can define "disorder" or "injury" at any level along
our continuum, and therein lies the problem. People talk past
each other in the silicone controversy because they define injury
5. 509 U.S. 1013 (1993).
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differently. Moreover, the increased incidence and prevalence of
the injury may result from varying combinations of exposure to
the implant and defects in the host response. That is, the rela-
tive contribution of environmental and genetic factors may vary
among implant recipients.
Second, exposure to implants should be more frequent among
those with a defined injury than in controls who do not have the
defined injury when all other risk factors are held constant. Of
course, this assumes you can control all other risk fac-
tors-something that is easier said than done. Third, in the
course of time, the injury or disorder that's alleged to have been
caused by the implant should follow that exposure. In other
words, the exposure ought to come first-you have to prove that
someone was exposed to silicone before an injury ensued.
Fourth, a spectrum of adverse effects or injuries should follow
exposure to implants along a logical biologic gradient from mild
to severe. This is the concept of dose-response that many of you
have heard about. With a little bit of exposure, you ought to get
a little bit of an effect. With a more intense or lengthier expo-
sure, you ought to get a little more effect. It's amazing how
many fact-finders do not understand this concept, and it's clearly
reflected in their decisions, because if they understood that fun-
damental concept, there's no way they could have logically
reached their conclusions based on science or medicine. And of
course this gets us back to the idea of using science or medicine
as a ruse or prop to accomplish something much more insidious,
much more under the table, namely, the imposition of 1995
standards of care for activities that went on 20, 30 or 40 years
ago.
Fifth, there must be a measurable injury following exposure to
implants. This injury should have a high probability of appear-
ing in those lacking the response before exposure, and the injury
or disorder should increase in magnitude if it was present prior
to exposure to implants. This response pattern should occur
infrequently, if at all, in persons not so exposed. Sixth, an exper-
imental reproduction of the injury or disorder should occur more
frequently in animals (or man) appropriately exposed to im-
plants than in those not so exposed; this exposure may be delib-
erate in volunteers or experimentally induced in the laboratory.
This means there ought to be an "animal model." Many toxicolo-
gists like to hang their hats on this one. Of course, there are
many courts that say they don't care what the animal data
shows or that a substance may cause injury to animals.
Elimination or modification of the implant or a component
part should decrease the incidence of injuries or disorders. Pre-
Vol. 34:899
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vention or modification of the host's response on exposure to the
implant should decrease or eliminate the injury or disorder. And
don't forget the ninth (last) criterion. An expert's opinion, includ-
ing her interpretations of relationships and findings in the liter-
ature, should make biologic, toxicologic, and epidemiologic sense.
If the expert's opinion or his evidence doesn't make sense to you,
stop and ask yourself: "What's wrong here? Does this person's
testimony comport with my own knowledge and/or experience?"
I think Daubert creates more work for judges, but I think
rightly so, because I don't believe in science courts. We don't
ultimately want scientists and physicians making these momen-
tous decisions; we just want their input. I believe the Third
Circuit has it right. I believe Judge Becker has it right. The In
re Paoli Railroad Yard PCB Litigation6 decision is one of the
best opinions to read in this area; an attempt to understand
Judge Becker's approach is worth an investment of your time.
I also like the decision in United States v. Downing.7 The
United States Supreme Court cited Downing in Daubert several
times with approval. I was on several panels the year before the
Daubert decision, and I don't mind saying that I was typically
the only person who predicted that the Supreme Court would go
with the Third Circuit. As I often say: "I'm from the Third Cir-
cuit, so I have to like what the Third Circuit does."
Let's turn our attention to legal concepts of causation. Let's
remind ourselves of the ways that lawyers and judges tradition-
ally think and communicate about causation. By the way, legal
reasoning and terminology regarding causation are quite foreign
to scientists and physicians. No matter how hard you try, many
of them just don't get it. Enough do, however, that it becomes
worthwhile to try to explain it to them.
Distinguish causation-in-fact from proximate causation. Re-
member there are a number of ways to describe cause in fact. If
I tip this pitcher of water over, I caused the spill. That's
fine-that's everyday language. The legal system, however, has
developed some terms of art, and all of you are familiar with the
"but for" concept of causation. But for the presence of an envi-
ronmental agent this injury would never have happened. But for
the collision this accident would never have happened. But for
this or that, an event would never have occurred. You are also
familiar with the "sine qua non" approach to legal causation, at
least when it comes to factual causation. A helpful scenario for
6. 35 F.3d 717 (3d Cir. 1994).
7. 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985).
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introducing physicians and scientists to the distinction between
factual causation and proximate causation is the "strike a
match" scenario. In Philadelphia, if I strike a match at Indepen-
dence Hall and the building burns down, and then the adjacent
building is consumed, and everything burns between Indepen-
dence Hall and the Spectrum or Veteran's stadium, it's obvious
that the person who struck the match caused-in-fact the confla-
gration all the way to Veteran's stadium.
To introduce the idea of proximate cause, I ask: "Are there
any other factors or 'causes' that may have contributed to such
an extensive fire? And should we hold the matchstriker liable for
all, or just part, of the damage done by the fire? Was it foresee-
able that striking a match in Independence Hall would lead to
the destruction of Veteran's stadium?" When the concept of fore-
seeability was introduced into American law, the question for
the courts became: "At what point do we draw a line and say
that cause-in-fact is no longer 'cause' for purposes of awarding
compensation for injuries?" Foreseeability in the law is often a
new concept for physicians and scientists. They are typically
surprised to learn that the term "proximate cause" means more
than cause-in-fact. With proximate causation, we're incorporat-
ing policymaking into the identification of the causal agent(s)
that the law will hold ultimately responsible for the foreseeable
aspects of harm.8
A third notion of causation-probabilistic causation-has also
evolved over the last century. Probabilistic causation relies on
probabilistic reasoning rather than on simple, deductively de-
rived causal chains. Problems have arisen however because, as
explained below, probabilistic reasoning can serve two analyti-
cally distinct purposes in legal proceedings.
Let's return to basic civil procedure and basic burdens of
proof. Traditionally, a plaintiff has two tasks, or burdens of
proof. First, the plaintiff must produce evidence or facts for each
element of a particular cause-of-action. Second, the plaintiff
must persuade the factfinder that the plaintiffs version of the
facts is worthy of their collective belief with a minimum level of
certainty, as defined by a standard of persuasion. The four com-
monly used standards are: a) "beyond a reasonable doubt" in
criminal cases; b) "by clear and convincing evidence" in some
civil cases; c) "more likely than not;" or d) "by a preponderance
of the evidence" in most civil cases, including toxic tort and
8. See, e.g., S. Borgo, Causal Paradigms in Tort Law, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 419
(1979).
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occupational disease claims.
Qualitative concepts of probability (as embodied in the above
standards) have long and explicitly influenced jury deliberations
as to whether or not the plaintiff has met the burden of persua-
sion. By contrast, in conventional personal injury litigation,
probability and inductive reasoning have not explicitly played a
role in factfinding per se. That is, the facts themselves, defined
as elements on which one party has the burden of production,
are generally deemed true or false-with a probability of either
0 or 1. For example, the light was either red or green, the
brakes either did or didn't work, or the pedestrian either did or
didn't fall.
Among the elements of a case which the plaintiff has the
burden of proving is causation-in-fact. This element is common
to toxic tort, hazardous waste, occupational disease, and conven-
tional traumatic injury claims. As noted above, causation-in-fact
probability is not an issue in most conventional injury cases.
The jury simply decides which version of the facts it believes in
an all-or-none, yes-or-no fashion, with no room for intermediate
probabilities. Causation evidence is not expressed
probabilistically.
This is not so in late 20th century environmental claims
where, given the frequent impossibility of proving individual
causation, statistical causation evidence (expressed
probabilistically) is required as a factual estimate of a
defendant's contribution to the plaintiffs risk. For example, the
issue in a typical trauma case may be whether or not a car could
have stopped at a red light.' Evidence might be heard on speed,
braking ability, and driver reaction time for that particular
vehicle (car X). The jury then finds that car X either could or
could not have stopped. However, in the absence of facts con-
cerning the individual car, undisputed evidence may show that
of 100 cars chosen at random, 55 would have been able to stop.
As to whether or not the plaintiff has met the burden of proof,
the jury could find either way, depending on how it responds to
probabilistic (statistical) evidence. Jury response is, in turn,
likely to be influenced by judicial instructions on inferences to be
drawn from group-based information.
The jury may believe that 55% of cars could have stopped, but
have no idea whether car X is among that group. Thus, the jury
would say that the plaintiff had not met the burden of proof.
9. See S. Gold, Causation in Toxic Torts: Burdens of Proof, Standards of Per-
suasion, and Statistical Evidence, 96 YALE L.J. 376 (1986).
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Alternatively, the jury may believe that 55% of cars could have
stopped and infer that car X (assuming it is not atypical) more
likely than not would have stopped since most cars would have.
This finding, however, incorporates an inference from estab-
lished fact about a population to a conclusion about a particular
car.
The propriety of this kind of inference is one of the most con-
troversial aspects of toxic tort and occupational disease cases,
where causation often cannot be properly formulated as a yes-or-
no fact. Instead, parties rely on evidence of increased risk or
enhanced probability of disease which may or may not be at-
tributable to the defendant's conduct. The inquiry becomes one
of the existence and magnitude of a fact probability. Therefore,
understanding the dual nature of probability, as both a factual
statistical quantity (fact probability) and a measure of strength
of belief (belief probability), becomes important. Unfortunately,
fact probability and belief probability have not been kept analyt-
ically distinct. Courts have "collapsed" the requirements for
burden of proof and burden of persuasion into one test which
blurs the plaintiffs two-fold task of defining not only the facts or
elements to be proven but also the amount of credence to be
accorded a fact in support of a finding. When a judge tells a jury
that "the plaintiff must show that causation is more likely than
not," the judge risks confusion. Does the judge mean that the
fact of causation which the plaintiff must prove (burden of proof)
.is not traditional true-or-false (100% vs. 0%) causation but only
the existence of a statistical probability of causation greater
than 50%? Or does the judge refer to the burden of persuasion
guided by a standard of belief that causation is "more likely
than not" true; that is, does the jury believe a knowable fact
with more than 50% confidence?
Concern over haphazard and unrecognized transfer of "pre-
ponderance of evidence" or "more likely than not" standards
from the burden of persuasion to the burden of factual proof
involves more than idle semantics. The adverse effects of failure
to undertake a deliberate, two-step probabilistic analysis in-
clude: a) undue preference for particular probabilities of causa-
tion found in one epidemiological study, especially when meta-
analysis of multiple studies is not possible or available; b) unrec-
ognized lowering of the burden of proof with concomitant stiffen-
ing of the burden (standard) of persuasion; c) inappropriate
fixation on simplistic quantitative rules such as the ">50% likeli-
hood" rule; and d) poorly reasoned opinions because courts fail to
explain exactly how they apply the >50%, "more-likely-than-not"
rule.
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Courts that apply the rule only to fact probabilities essentially
seek a yes-or-no belief in a >50% fact probability. By contrast,
traditional courts that apply the rule only to belief probabilities
seek a >50% belief in a yes-or-no fact. In toxic tort/occupational
disease claims where both fact probability and belief probability
are issues, there are at least two other approaches. Courts could
apply the "more-likely-than-not" standard jointly, reducing al-
leged fact probability by a factor reflecting the jury's doubt about
its truth. By contrast, the rule could be applied sequentially to
require only a >50% belief in a fact probability which itself may
barely exceed the >50% threshold. It is important to see that
joint application stiffens the causation burden-of-produc-
tion/burden-of-persuasion, while sequential application substan-
tially lessens the causation production/persuasion requirements.
The point here is that, regardless of approach, a court that deals
with causal indeterminacy characteristic of toxic
tort/occupational disease claims should be explicit about what it
is doing, especially if the defendant's culpability of conduct or
duty to prevent risk is factored into determination of the causa-
tion issue.
You may be thinking: "Judges and juries don't operate at this
level; we let the chips fall where they may and we can't get into
a juror's mind." But as jurists, you ought to at least develop a
framework for thinking about what kind of evidence you're going
to allow and what kind of evidence you're going to exclude. The
kind of analysis reviewed here is offered to help you clarify your
own thought processes.
Let's talk about the use of experts. In toxic tort and product
liability litigation, where do experts get used? It typically de-
pends on what the plaintiff believes has to be proven. Most like-
ly, you're going to have experts testify for one or more of five
purposes. First, the plaintiff must prove exposure. Toxicologists
aren't necessarily the people that prove exposure. Industrial
hygienists, safety officers, environmental scientists, geologists,
and others get involved at this stage of the litigation. Next, you
bring somebody in to prove a causal relationship between the
alleged toxic substance and the harm. We've talked about the
burden of production, the burden of persuasion, and the stan-
dard of persuasion. Again, remember that the definition of com-
pensable injury is ultimately going to drive the quantum and
nature of the proof offered to establish a relationship between
the substance and the harm.
Third, diagnosis or proof of harm is typically required. Again,
the characterization of the injury is crucial. It's much easier to
prove "presence" or "impact" than it is to prove "adverse effect,"
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"disease," or "disorder." And many courts do not require the tes-
timony of a physician toxicologist in tort cases involving toxic
chemicals. There are about 6,000 individuals in the U.S. who
hold themselves out as toxicologists. Analytical toxicologists,
who are typically responsible for laboratory testing and its prop-
er interpretation, are most often associated with crime labs,
clinical labs, or independent operations. Some analytical toxicol-
ogists participate in the legal process; others do not. Those that
do are frequently called "forensic toxicologists." Regulatory toxi-
cologists, by contrast, work in state or federal agencies or in the
pharmaceutical industry where they undertake risk assessments
or assure the safety of drugs or devices before marketing. Veteri-
nary toxicologists usually confine their practices to the care of
animals, while physicians trained in various medical specialties
practice as medical or clinical toxicologists treating poisoned
patients and consulting with poison control centers or other
physicians. Finally, there's a group of several thousand scien-
tists who are interested in the fundamental biochemical mecha-
nisms by which chemicals injure cells. These professionals are
known as research, biochemical, or mechanistic toxicologists.
There are several certifying boards for practitioners of toxicol-
ogy. The American Board of Toxicology has certified over 1500
Ph.D. or other doctoral level individuals practicing in govern-
ment, industry, or academia. The American Board of Clinical
Chemistry has certified approximately 100 Ph.D.'s as toxicologi-
cal chemists. The American Board of Forensic Toxicology has
certified several hundred forensic professionals. The American
Board of Veterinary Toxicology has certified about 100 veterinar-
ians. Finally, the American Board of Medical Specialties has
designated Medical Toxicology as a subspecialty with a joint
certification process sponsored by the American Boards of Emer-
gency Medicine, Pediatrics, and Preventive Medicine.
Thus, many toxicologists who provide expert testimony are not
physicians; indeed, a significant number of those who testify
have not acquired any doctoral credentials. Their testimony,
nevertheless, is valued and desirable and has been admitted into
evidence for decades. Importantly, toxicology is one of the few
arenas in which courts allow non-physicians to render both diag-
nostic and causation opinions. You need these experts to prove
the fourth and fifth elements of the plaintiffs toxic tort case,
namely, that the cognizable harm is consistent with the expo-
sure, and that the defendant was responsible for the harm. Of
course, other types of expertise may be required to prove that
the defendant's product, activity, or release contributed to the
plaintiff's injuries.
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Regarding the silicone breast implant controversy, let me alert
you to the concerns that led the FDA to severely limit the mar-
ket for these devices. The agency issued a report in the early
1990's detailing what it believed to be the biologic risks associat-
ed with implantation of devices containing polydimethylsiloxane.
The FDA said there were immunologic risks, sensitization risks,
risks from leakage, risks from infection, capsular contraction,
and calcification, and risks from migration or degradation of
silicone in other parts of the body. Concern was also expressed
about the possibility of autoimmune disorders, carcinogenicity,
teratogenicity, and interference with interpretation of mammog-
raphy. To this day, however, the FDA has never stated that
silicone implants have been shown to "cause" systemic injury or
illness.
In my view, the silicone breast implant litigation could rede-
fine legal concepts of soft tissue injury." I previously suggested
that plaintiffs' verdicts primarily reflect jury outrage over the
failure of manufacturers to employ 1995 standards in safety
evaluations undertaken during the sixties and seventies. Howev-
er, the nature of the scientific evidence that's being presented to
enable plaintiffs to withstand motions for summary judgment
also merits scrutiny. To support a causal connection between
exposure to implants and the development of novel or previously
unrecognized connective tissue or autoimmune disorders, plain-
tiffs with unremarkable physical examinations have relied on
subjective reporting of symptoms plus the results of laboratory
tests that indicate the presence of antibodies to silicone or other
foreign substances, and/or the presence of autoantibodies.
Plaintiffs' counsel have sought to equate the combination of
unverifiable symptomatology and antibodies to silicone with
legally compensable injury. I want to emphasize the novelty and
potentially far-reaching ramifications of this characterization of
injury for law, science, and medicine.
The production of antibodies is a normal and expected re-
sponse to the presence of foreign substances. And the regulated
production of autoantibodies to human proteins or antigens is
also a normal, expected, required event. Only when these re-
quired normal events get out of control do you have the potential
for injury or disease. The mere presence of autoantibodies is not
sufficient for a designation of autoimmune injury or disease. Let
me emphasize that loss of immune tolerance or loss of immune
10. See D.E. SPIVACK & JACK W. SNYDER, Breast Implant Cases, in HANDLING
OF SOFT TISSUE INJURY CASES 433-505 (Cyril H. Wecht et al. eds., 2d ed. 1993).
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regulatory control has yet been shown to be the result of implan-
tation of silicone devices. Indeed, the American Rheumatology
Association has stated that evidence of injury or harm to the
immune system has not been shown in silicone breast implant
recipients. Therefore, the ground-breaking question for law,
science, and medicine is whether or not to redefine or signifi-
cantly expand traditional concepts of diseased or injured persons
to include those who report symptoms and demonstrate expect-
ed, required, normal responses or results during laboratory test-
ing.
Q. Many times we've seen that 15-20 years later in asbestosis
or silicosis, where people said there's no causal relationship and
these people were otherwise healthy, we have nothing else to
explain it and there is a latency. I can remember dealing with a
case many years ago where a woman complained of something
and was denied social security disability benefits, and fourteen
years later it appeared in medical literature, and nine years
later in psychiatric literature. She reported the same symptom-
atology for thirteen years and was called a liar. Women are not
believed but a man saying it is important, it has a different
perspective. How do you factor that?
A. Questions about latency arise frequently in many toxico-
logic contexts. At least two of the pneumoconioses have been
linked in the epidemiologic literature to one or more tumors.
There is, however, to my knowledge, no evidence that the inci-
dence or prevalence of cancer is increased in women with sili-
cone breast implants. The FDA is one of the few groups that I'm
aware of that has implied that the risk of tumorigenesis from
exposure to silicone implants may be significant. The reason for
the fundamental tension that you are raising is that we don't
know what to do with the latency problem. No one knows what
to do because, for most exposures, you can't predict it, at least
not yet.
Ideally, each decision in mass tort litigation or in individual
cases should rise or fall on the merits. The issue of latency may
or may not be addressed. It is possible that in ten or twenty
years, some women exposed to silicone will develop either a
well-known disorder or a heretofore not previously described
disorder. Obviously, anything is possible and any expert worth
his or her salt will acknowledge that in this or any other forum.
You have to take each environmental agent and each symp-
tom or objective manifestation and ask yourself: "What can sci-
ence and medicine tell us about possible relationships?" At this
point, I do not believe we can causally link silicone, as studied in
the test tube, tissues, or elsewhere, with any of the systemic
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problems that have been described. The only objective evidence
that has been brought to the table is data from laboratory tests.
And I have just now suggested to you that the results of those
tests are not necessarily abnormal or indicative of harm, injury,
or disease.
Q. Don't they have toxicological evidence from other studies?
A. For silicone? Now you've opened another Pandora's box in
the breast implant litigation. The silicon atom takes many dif-
ferent forms in nature. Some of these forms cause various bio-
logic effects, but most do not. Although a few reports suggest
that some forms of silicon may enhance the immunogenicity of
other chemicals in test tube experiments, reproducible evidence
of tissue damage has not been shown for the forms and concen-
trations of silicone found in breast implants. From the toxicolo-
gy, chemistry, and pathology perspective, let me emphasize that
the chemical configuration in which the silicon atom is found in
implants is distinctly different from that for the silicon associat-
ed with silicosis. Silicon is not silicon is not silicon. You have to
know what form of silicon you're dealing with before you render
any opinions about its possible biologic effects. For example, the
polydimethylsiloxane found in breast implants must be chemi-
cally and toxicologically distinguished from silicon dioxide and
the silicates.
What I am trying to impart here is that we are on the preci-
pice of doing something unprecedented in American medicine
and in American jurisprudence. With the exception of psychiat-
ric diagnoses, we have not yet recognized compensable injuries,
diseases, or disorders solely on the basis of subjectively reported
symptoms. Those individuals who report symptoms in the con-
text of multiple chemical sensitivities or silicone breast implan-
tation genuinely believe they have a physical (non-psychiatric)
problem, and no reasonable physician is going to question that
these patients perceive that they have an illness. But in the
absence of objective evidence of physical or laboratory abnormal-
ities, how should American medicine and jurisprudence respond
to those who say that they have been harmed by various forces
in their environment? Jurists will play a key role in determining
what kinds of objective evidence, if any, are going to be required
or admissible to support subjective reporting of symptoms. In my
opinion, jurists could enhance the public confidence in principled
legal decisions by more frequently articulating the reasons why
they chose to admit or exclude novel or controversial types of
expert testimony.
Let me remind you of some of the problems that remain for
the jurist post-Daubert. Does Daubert apply to jury as well as
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non-jury trials? Does the decision apply to all, or just novel ex-
pert testimony? Does Daubert apply only to "scientific" experts?
In appellate courts, how much de novo review is warranted? As
gatekeepers, you may need to look at several aspects of an
expert's testimony, including the theory or reasoning behind it,
the methodology or technique employed, the protocols followed,
the data generated, the conclusion reached, or the interpretation
of the opinion in a legal context. Daubert seems to indicate that
the Federal Rules only require the reasoning or methodology
underlying the testimony to be scientifically valid. If either of
these aspects of an expert's opinion have the indicia of validity,
it would appear that testimony governed by the Federal Rules
should be admitted. But is the Daubert approach restricted to
assessment of the validity of theory or method, or should courts
look behind apparently legitimate reasoning or technique and
evaluate the legitimacy of the results as embodied in proper
following of protocols, generation of data, and reaching of conclu-
sions? In the same vein, is the apparent Daubert distinction
between theory and methodology realistic or useful? Perhaps,
but courts must recognize that two experts operating under the
same generally accepted theory may employ radically different
methods, each of which may be generally accepted in one scien-
tific community but not in the other. In those situations, courts
must recognize that experts from different disciplines often
make certain assumptions that can never by "scientifically"
proven, and that these assumptions may lead legitimate experts
to equally logical, but clearly opposite conclusions. Regarding the
indicia of validity and reliability, how should courts weigh the
factors enunciated by the Daubert Court? How do courts factor
the importance of peer review, publication, testing, rates of er-
ror, the existence or lack of standards, and the notions of wide-
spread or general acceptance? The Court did not state that any
one indicator of validity or reliability is essential under the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence. And finally, what is meant by reliability
and validity? The scientific and medical literature definition of
these terms is quite different from the definitions used by the
Supreme Court and legal commentators. In science and medi-
cine, reliability refers to precision or reproducibility, while valid-
ity basically refers to accuracy. By contrast, many legal commen-
tators and courts have equated reliability with accuracy or the
probability of accuracy, and validity with sound reasoning. Ju-
rists should not be surprised that scientists or physicians may
not understand or accept the meanings or connotations that
courts and some members of the bar have applied to the terms
"reliability" and "accuracy." Thus, it would appear that uniformi-
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ty of approach to the admissibility of scientific evidence will not
easily be'accomplished on the heels of Daubert.
Q. We've heard many times, whether under Frye v. United
States" or Daubert, that ours is an advocacy system and it is
not a magisterial system. Everything you're saying I would rely
on the defense attorney to do. If a guy walks into court and is
the greatest b.s. artist, I have no way of knowing whether it is
the truth. If he's made a great impression and I'm the trier of
fact, he may have won me over to his side. I have no other way
of knowing anything about him, other than what I hear in the
courtroom. I would assume that if you're a total fraud, that the
defense attorney in an adversarial role would show that to me. I
would rely upon the advocates. I cannot use my own personal
opinions, but this is the theme that I've gotten out of this. A
group of forensic experts is deeply concerned that false science is
taking over the system and clogging the courts. But under an
adversarial system, the judges can't get into that other than in
each individual courtroom.
A. All I'm suggesting is that counsel meet those burdens and
do their jobs with varying levels of sophistication. I guess that's
almost stating the obvious, but our job here is to alert you con-
ceptually to what's going on so that you can at least begin to
sniff out that which is fraudulent from that which is not and
that which is strong from that which is weak. But most of all, it
comes back to what you as a jurist and what any fact-finder is
going to recognize as compensable injury. The point is, as a
society, we have simultaneously broadened both the concept of
compensable injury and the cottage industry of expert testimony.
Q. Isn't this going to be a political decision? Isn't Congress or
a legislature sooner or later going to say enough is enough?
A. I would say yes. Everything is ultimately a political deci-
sion, especially if we're going to work at the societal level.
Q. There are judges who are defense lawyers so you're going
to get some rulings that favor one side or the other and that
seem to depend on bias.
A. Perhaps an analogy could be made to the percentage of the
GDP that is devoted to health care. As a society, we're at the
15% level now, and obviously one of the things we're grappling
with is the projection that it could reach 20% to 25% of the GDP
within our lifetimes. The question is, to what extent, as a legal
system, do we want our courts to be dealing with toxic tort or
product liability cases as opposed to any other kind of litigation?
11. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
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We could make 25, 30 or 40% of all the cases brought in some
courts this kind of litigation if we chose to do that. As long as
the pressure remains to broaden the definition of compensable
injury to include risk or latency or fear of harm, courts and
society will increasingly have to decide if we want to compensate
now for the possibility of what is perceived to be harm in the
future. I can't overemphasize what I see as a tremendous push
in our society to redistribute wealth in response to smaller and
smaller increments of perceived injury. By the way, for those of
you wanting to guess who might write future Supreme Court
opinions in the toxic tort arena, I suggest you read Justice
Breyer's book Breaking the Vicious Circle.1"
Q. Isn't it more likely that this is not going to be resolved on a
scientific basis? You're very persuasive on what you're saying
until the business aspect of practicing law is considered.
A. At some point, as a society, we may decide we can't spend
all this money such that a few people get millions and a lot of
people get virtually nothing. We've got to figure out better ways
to handle the various social costs associated with new inventions
and new creations.
12. STEPHEN G. BREYER, BREAKING THE Vicious CmiCLE (1993).
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